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ABSTRACT
A measure of romantic relationship schema complexity 
(RRSC) is proposed and compared with several individual 
difference measures. Forty-nine undergraduates, each of whom 
was currently involved in a heterosexual romantic 
relationship with someone in the local area, completed 
several questionnaires and a take-home computerized 
questionnaire. Results showed no relationship between RRSC 
and Need for Cognition, Attributional Complexity, overall 
cognitive complexity, gender, relationship length, or 
affective extremity in response to positive or negative 
relationship event scenarios. Participants with more complex 
romantic relationship schemas unexpectedly showed more 
variability in their evaluations of relationship events over 
a two-week period than those with simpler schemas. These 
results were interpreted in light of previous research on 
self-schema complexity, cognitive complexity, and the social 
cognition of romantic relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
The Utility of the Schema Concept in Relationships Research
In the classical cognitive sense, schemas are cognitive 
structures which organize prior knowledge in ways that 
facilitate the processing of new information as well as the 
retrieval of old information. Schemas facilitate the storage 
of content knowledge and the use of such knowledge by aiding 
in both the storage and the retrieval of long-term memory 
(Fiske & Linville, 1980).
The use of schemas in social psychology has attracted 
much criticism. The schema concept, when used outside 
cognitive psychology, has been accused of being vague, 
unfalsifiable, or simply "old wine in a new bottle" (Fiske & 
Linville, 1980, p. 545). While some of these criticisms may 
contain a kernel of truth, Fiske and Linville point out that 
the advantages significantly outweigh the liabilities when 
it comes to applying the schema concept to social 
psychology. The application of schemas to social 
psychological questions provides a good way to examine 
complex knowledge. However one looks at it, a mental 
construct based on experience and memory is. a schema, and 
our knowledge of how to navigate many complex social events 
should fall under this rubric. The applicability of the 
schema concept to social psychology, therefore, should not 
be in doubt. Social events and interactions can be very 
complex, so good explanations of them must rely on complex 
cognitive structures, i.e., schemas.
2According to Fletcher and Thomas (1996) , nowhere are 
knowledge constructs more useful than in the domain of close 
relationships, particularly romantic ones. Fletcher and 
Thomas (1996) offer three reasons why people have such 
complex schemas relating to social relationships. First, for 
most people, close relationships represent an enduring, 
important theme in their lives. Second, people receive an 
almost constant influx of information about close 
relationships through fictional and nonfictional media. 
Third, our lives are fraught with models who help us build 
close relationship theories even before we are old enough to 
become involved in them. In this study, an attempt is made 
to assess romantic relationship schema complexity (RRSC) and 
relate it to various individual differences in attitudes and 
emotion.
Cognitive Complexity
The definition of cognitive complexity is intimately 
tied to the methods used to measure it. In general, however, 
cognitive complexity is typically defined in terms of 
differentiation and integration (Fletcher, Danilovics, 
Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986). Differentiation refers 
to the number of characteristics or dimensions into which a 
cognitive structure may be divided. Integration refers to 
the degree to which the divisions arrived at by 
differentiation overlap. Some early studies used measures of 
cognitive complexity which relied solely on differentiation
(e.g., Zajonc, 1960). Most modern methods of assessing 
cognitive or schema complexity, including Attneave's (1959)
H statistic, combine measures of differentiation and 
integration. In the current study, differentiation and 
integration were both considered important components of 
complexity because to ignore the integrative aspect of 
complexity wastes information.
Is Cognitive Complexity a General Personality Trait or Is it 
Domain-specific?
In the past, there has been some dispute over whether 
cognitive complexity is a general personality trait (Person 
A is either simple, complex, or somewhere in between) or a 
characteristic of a particular cognitive domain (Person A is 
complex in Domain 1, but simple in Domain 2). The findings 
of a few researchers (e.g. Bieri & Blacker, 1956; Allard & 
Carlson, 1963) tend to support the "general trait" 
hypothesis. The studies which report findings supporting the 
generality of cognitive complexity also tend to be the early 
ones.
Crockett (1965) argues for the domain-specificity of 
cognitive complexity, claiming that complexity should be 
viewed as a characteristic of particular knowledge domains 
rather than as a general cognitive trait. Experience with a 
particular knowledge domain, Crockett claims, makes one more 
aware of subtle differences between units of a knowledge 
domain, enabling one to behave differentially to these
4subtle differences. Complexity in one domain need not 
predict complexity in another.
The general consensus today is that cognitive 
complexity is not a general personality trait, but rather a 
specific trait of particular knowledge domains. As such, it 
has come to be called "schema complexity" because this term 
more clearly denotes the domain-specificity of the 
complexity construct. Many researchers have demonstrated 
that schema complexity is domain-specific. For example, 
Fletcher et al. (1986) argue that schema complexity is
related to the degree of knowledge and interest in a given 
area and is thus bound to be domain-specific to some extent. 
Zajonc (1960) also treats cognitive complexity as a domain- 
specific variable. However, despite his conclusion that 
cognitive complexity is domain-specific, Crockett (1965) 
points out that people with a complex cognitive system in 
one domain will tend to show a high level of complexity in 
other domains as well.
Vannoy (1965) compared twenty different measures of 
cognitive complexity. He found that the combined test 
results loaded onto eight distinct factors rather than one 
unitary factor, indicating that cognitive complexity is not 
a general personality trait. This is not surprising, as many 
of the researchers reviewed based their measures on 
different theories of the nature of cognitive complexity. 
Other researchers have demonstrated domain-specific schema
5complexity in such areas as ingroup-outgroup evaluations 
(Linville & Jones, 1980; Linville, 1982), attribution 
(Fletcher et al., 1986), cognitive balance (Scott, 1963), 
and self-schemas (Linville, 1985). It is assumed in the 
present study that complexity is domain-specific. While 
broader measures of a person's tendency toward complexity or 
simplicity (e.g., need for cognition, attributional 
complexity, etc.) may influence the complexity of a 
particular schema, it is also likely that domain-specific 
expertise, individual experience, and other factors also 
influence the complexity of any given schema.
Complexity of the self-schema
Linville (1982) showed that people have more complex 
cognitive representations of their own group than of other 
groups and that people evaluate members of other groups more 
extremely than members of their own group. Building on this 
research, Linville developed a model of self-schema 
complexity. Linville's (1985) model rests on four 
assumptions. Her first assumption is that the self is 
organized as a sort of associative network of interconnected 
nodes. These cognitive nodes represent aspects of the self. 
For example, a woman might think of herself in terms of 
multiple social roles (doctor, real estate agent, musician), 
interpersonal relationships (provider, employee, mother), 
and/or traits (beautiful, musically talented, unpleasant).
The second assumption is that different aspects of the
6self are linked to varying levels of affect and self- 
appraisal. A man may simultaneously think of himself as a 
bad employee but also as a good father. Alternatively, 
success in one aspect of the self may enhance positive 
feelings about the self as a whole, while failure may have 
the opposite effect.
The third assumption is that there are individual 
differences in the degree of complexity of people's self­
representation. According to Linville, self-complexity is a 
joint function of both the number of self-aspects (or nodes 
on a person's associative network) and the degree of 
interrelatedness, or redundancy, among those aspects. In 
other words, self-complexity is best understood in terms of 
both integration and differentiation. For example, a woman's 
role as a mother is independent of her role as a worker to 
the extent that failure in one role does not affect 
performance or self-appraisal in the other. The degree of 
overlap between two aspects may also reflect the degree to 
which the roles actually depend on each other. For example, 
if a woman's relationship with her husband depends heavily 
on her ability to raise children, then failure in one domain 
can lead to failure in the other. It may also be the case 
that the woman merely perceives these two aspects of herself 
to be related, and regardless of the actual degree of 
overlap, emotional spillover may occur because the two 
domains are conceptually linked.
7Returning to the associative network metaphor, this 
spillover may be conceptualized as spreading activation.
Self-appraisal regarding one aspect of the self will spread 
to other aspects as a function of the degree of their 
interrelatedness. For example, if an attorney wins his case, 
this might lead to a substantial improvement in his feelings 
about his professional performance, which may in turn lead 
to a moderate improvement in his feelings about himself as a 
provider, which may lead to a small improvement in his 
feelings about himself as a husband. A higher degree of 
self-schema complexity would lead to a lower degree of this 
emotional spillover because the boundaries between "nodes" 
are better defined. In other words, his roles as an attorney 
and a husband would have less to do with each other; 
therefore, an affective state resulting from a change in one 
role would not be likely to generalize to his other roles.
Linville's (1982) fourth assumption is that a person's 
global appraisal of him- or herself is a function of the 
affect and self-appraisal associated with all the aspects of 
the self. Linville postulates that overall affect and self- 
appraisal are a weighted average of affect and self- 
appraisal at all levels of the self. Thus, those with simple 
self-schemas should exhibit more extreme positive and 
negative self-appraisal because they are more prone to 
emotional spill-over than are those with complex self- 
schemas. On the other hand, those with complex self-schemas
8are likely to have less extreme and less variable self- 
appraisals. Linville (1985) found support for the hypothesis 
that lower levels of self-schema complexity are related to 
more extreme swings in affect and self-appraisal. She also 
showed that, over a two-week period, participants with a low 
degree of self-schema complexity showed more variability in 
affect than those with a high degree of self-schema 
complexity.
Linville (1987) also showed that a high degree of self- 
complexity is beneficial to individuals under high stress, 
because a complex self-schema c’hn act as a buffer against 
the negative consequences of stress, such as depression and 
illness. In conditions of high stress, participants with 
complex self-schemas showed fewer stress-related symptoms 
than those with simple self-schemas.
The Romantic Relationship Schema
Fiske and Linville (1980) point out that the schema 
concept has not been widely linked to interpersonal 
behavior, describing the link between cognitive schemas and 
behavior as an "untapped gold mine" (p. 549). Nearly twenty 
years later, the use of schemas in the study of 
interpersonal behavior has been explored by many 
researchers, but it remains a fertile field for scientific 
enquiry. In response to the challenge put forward by Fiske 
and Linville, one of the primary goals of the current study 
is to establish the existence of a construct known as a
9"romantic relationship schema," which may be defined as a 
person's internal working model of a particular romantic 
relationship. The romantic relationship schema concept is 
similar in both scope and nature to Linville's (1985) 
concept of the self-schema.
A romantic relationship schema is closely akin to 
Andersen's idea of a "relational schema," but more specific. 
According to Andersen, a relational schema embodies our 
beliefs and expectancies about a type of relationship (e.g., 
romantic relationships in general). Violations of this 
schema (such as inappropriate or excessive intimacy) may 
result in negative relationship outcomes ranging from 
dissatisfaction to relationship termination (Andersen,
1992). A relational schema is qualitatively different than a 
schema for one's romantic partner. Consider the case of a 
woman who hates her spouse, yet stays married in order to 
preserve the relationship (Andersen, 1989).
In contrast, romantic relationship schemas are specific 
to particular relationships. They not only dictate 
relationship-appropriate behaviors (as per Horowitz's (1988) 
"role-relationship models"), but encompass an individual's 
entire schematic and memorial representation of that 
relationship. Like Linville's self-schema, a romantic 
relationship schema may be thought of in terms of an 
association network consisting of several nodes. Unlike 
Linville's self-schema, however, romantic relationship
10
schemas are conceptualized to represent permanent yet 
flexible cognitive representations of romantic 
relationships. While a person's ideal relationship may be 
represented by a single schema, particular relationships are 
likely to vary from one to the next, as will the schemas 
associated with them. Thus, romantic relationship schemas 
are relationship-specific. For a given individual, the 
schema for one romantic relationship may be more or less 
complex than the schema for a different romantic 
relationship. Like Linville's self-schema, the complexity of 
romantic relationship schemas should vary between 
individuals, but also within individuals across 
relationships (and perhaps within specific relationships 
over time).
Martin (1991) devised an instrument to measure the 
complexity of relationship thinking known as the Relational 
Cognition Complexity Instrument (RCCI). Respondents describe 
three relationships, and their descriptions are later coded 
by summing the number of relational constructs to yield a 
measure of complexity. Rather than combining measures of 
differentiation and integration, the RCCI relies solely upon 
differentiation. For this reason, and because the RCCI was 
designed to assess the complexity of a broader level of 
relationship thinking than specific romantic relationships 
represent, it was felt that the RCCI would be an inadequate 
measure of RRSC. Since some important questions in the
11
present study revolve around the variability of affect 
associated with a specific relationship, it was felt that a 
measure of RRSC specific to a particular romantic 
relationship would be more appropriate.,
Hypotheses
It follows from Linville1s (1987) buffering hypothesis 
and from Linville (1985) that if a complex self-schema acts 
as a buffer against the consequences of stress, then a 
complex romantic relationship schema should act as a buffer 
against consequences of negative relationship events. In 
addition, because people with simple self-schemas show more 
extreme swings in affect and self-appraisal, those with 
simple romantic relationship schemas should show more 
extreme swings in relationship-oriented affect. Given that 
individuals should vary in the complexity of their schemas 
for their current romantic relationships, it is hypothesized 
that participants with highly complex romantic relationship 
schemas will have less extreme emotional reactions to 
relationship events than will participants with less complex 
romantic relationship schemas. It is also predicted that 
these individuals will exhibit less variability in their 
emotional reactions to relationship events over time than 
individuals with more complex romantic relationship schemas.
Need for cognition, as defined by Cohen, Stotland, and 
Wolfe (1955), is "a need to understand and make reasonable 
the experiential world" (p. 291). Cohen (1957) found that
12
individuals high in need for cognition were more likely than 
those low in need for cognition to organize, elaborate, and 
evaluate information. As defined by Cacioppo and Petty 
(1982), the need for cognition is the "tendency to engage in 
and enjoy thinking" (p. 116). Filling the necessity for an 
adequate measure of the need for cognition, Cacioppo and 
Petty (1982) developed and tested the Need for Cognition 
Scale (NCS) and subsequently a short form of the NCS 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) to measure the need for 
cognition. Both the full version and the short form have 
received considerable support (Sadowski, 1993; Sadowski & 
Gulgoz, 1992; Tolentino, Curry, & Leak, 1990) and show 
excellent convergent and discriminant validity (Osberg,
1987). Cronbach's alpha as a measure of reliability for the 
34-item version of the NCS has been found to range from .65 
to .90 (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Cacioppo and Petty (1982) 
showed that those high in need for cognition preferred a 
complex task to a simple one, and those low in need for 
cognition preferred a simple task to a complex one.
Tanaka, Panter, & Winborne (1988) hypothesized that 
Cacioppo and Petty's (1982) assessment of need for cognition 
might be better understood in terms of the scale's 
constituent parts. Upon factor analyzing the 34-item version 
of the NCS, the authors found that the items loaded onto 
three factors rather than one, as had been reported by 
Cacioppo and Petty (1982). Twenty-five items were chosen
13
from the set of 34; items were retained if they loaded on 
one and only one factor. The obtained factors were 
interpreted by the authors to represent subscales measuring 
Cognitive Persistence, Cognitive Complexity, and Cognitive 
Confidence. A Cronbach's alpha of .57 was found for the 
Cognitive Complexity subscale (hereafter referred to as 
"CC"), indicating a moderate degree if internal consistency. 
According to Tanaka et al. (1988), an individual scoring
high on the Cognitive Complexity subscale tends to prefer 
complex relative to simple cognitive demands, repeating a 
conclusion drawn by the original authors regarding the 34- 
item version of the NCS (1982).
It can be inferred from Cohen (1957), Cacioppo and 
Petty (1982), and other evidence that at least part of the 
NCS reflects cognitive complexity (e.g., Tanaka et al.,
19 88), that people with tendencies to form more complex 
schemas will be higher in need for cognition than people 
with tendencies to form less complex schemas. It is 
hypothesized that people with complex romantic relationship 
schemas will exhibit a higher need for cognition, as 
measured by the 34-item version of Cacioppo et al. (1982)
scale, than people with simple romantic relationship 
schemas.
Fletcher et al. (1986) hypothesized that people differ
in the complexity of their attributional schemas. They 
proposed seven attributional constructs which might be
14
measured along a simple-complex dimension: the level of 
interest or motivation, the preference for complex rather 
than simple explanations, the presence of metacognition 
concerning explanations, the awareness of the extent to 
which people's behavior is a function of interaction with 
others, the tendency to infer abstract or causally complex 
internal attributions, the tendency to infer abstract, 
contemporary, external causal attributions, and the tendency 
to infer external causes operating from the past.
To test their theory, Fletcher et al. (1986) devised
the Attributional Complexity Scale (ACS). The ACS was found 
to have an internal reliability coefficient (alpha) of .85, 
and a test-retest reliability of .80. the ACS was also found 
to have good convergent and discriminant validity. The 
authors found that women possessed more complex 
attributional schemas than men. They also found a moderate 
positive correlation between scores on the ACS and scores on 
the NCS, lending credence to the hypothesis that at least 
one measure of schema complexity is related to the need for 
cognition. Based on the work of Fletcher et al. (1986), it
is hypothesized that individuals with high romantic 
relationship schema complexity (RRSC) will exhibit a greater 
degree of attributional complexity than will individuals 
with low RRSC.
Despite the predictions that RRSC will be positively 
correlated with other measures of complexity, it is believed
15
that RRSC is more domain-specific than general cognitive 
complexity or attributional complexity. Thus, while positive 
correlations are expected, they should not be particularly 
strong.
There is ample evidence to suggest that women think 
more complexly about relationships than do men. Women have 
more complex constructs of other people than do men 
(Supnick, 1964) . Women have more complex explanations for 
marital separation than do men (Fletcher, 1983). Fletcher et 
al. (1986) found that women are more attributionally complex
than men. In addition, Martin (1991) found that women are 
more relationally complex thinkers than are men. Although 
Tanaka et al. (1988) did not detect gender difference in the
cognitive complexity subscale of the 34-item NCS, Waters and 
Zakrajsek (1990), with a larger sample, contradicted this 
finding by showing that women scored higher on the cognitive 
complexity subscale of the NCS than men. It is therefore 
hypothesized that women will show a greater degree of RRSC 
than will men.
It is also predicted that the complexity of a person's 
romantic relationship schema will increase with the length 
of the relationship. For example, a person on a blind date 
knows virtually nothing about her date on their first 
meeting, and thus knows very little about how the 
relationship will progress (i.e., she has a very simple 
schema regarding her relationship with her date). Once the
16
relationship has had time to develop and both partners have 
had ample opportunity to become familiar with facets of each 
other's lives, we would expect her romantic relationship 
schema to become more complex and multi-faceted. This 
hypothesis is perfectly in line with Crockett's (1965) 
prediction that the degree of domain-specific complexity 
probably depends on the amount of interaction one has with 
the domain in question. In addition, Linville and Jones 
(1980) suggest that the reason why in-group schemas are more 
complex than out-group schemas is because in-group schemas 
are based on large amounts of rich experience with in-group 
members, while out-group schemas are based on less 
experience.
Of course, the direction of causality might point in 
the opposite direction. Crouse, Karlins, and Schroder (1968) 
showed that the happiest married couples were the most 
cognitively complex ones. Perhaps complexity leads to 
relationship longevity just as much as longevity leads to 
complexity. Regardless, the relationship between longevity 
and complexity should be positive.
To summarize, seven major hypotheses will be tested. 
RRSC is expected to be negatively related to the extremity 
and variability of evaluation to relationship events. RRSC 
is expected to positively related to Need for Cognition, 
Attributional Complexity, and relationship length. In 
addition, women are expected to have more complex romantic
17
relationship schemas than men, and the measure of RRSC used 
in the present study is expected to be moderately correlated 
with a more general measure of cognitive complexity.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 30 female and 19 male undergraduates. 
Participants were screened prior to the study to ensure that 
they were currently involved in romantic relationships with 
local partners. Local partners were required in order to 
maximize the probability that participants would interact 
with their partners on a daily basis. Participants were 
contacted via telephone and invited to participate in a 
three-part program of study, as described below.
Procedure
After giving their informed consent, participants 
performed a card-sorting task closely resembling the one 
used by Linville (1985) to assess self-complexity. In 
Linville's study, participants were asked to sort a 
collection of 34 self descriptors into meaningful piles, 
from which a measure of self-complexity (H) was calculated.
A pilot study, using 11 participants, was conducted to 
assess the feasibility of transferring Linville's card- 
sorting task to the current situation. Participant 
performance conformed to expectations.
In the present study, self descriptors were replaced 
with 34 different romantic relationship descriptors (e.g.,
18
intimate, spontaneous, unhealthy), gleaned from studies by 
Fehr and Russell (1991) and Preslar and Pilkington (1997). 
Each participant was presented with a deck of 44 3" x 5" 
index cards. Thirty-four of the cards each contained a 
different relationship descriptor (see Appendix A) and a 
number, and the other ten were left blank. Participants were 
instructed to create as many piles as they wanted, with each 
pile representing a particular aspect of the participant's 
current romantic relationship. Each pile could have as many 
or as few cards as the participant desired, and a descriptor 
could be placed in more than one pile if necessary (the 
blank cards were included for this purpose). Participants 
were instructed to record the groupings of card numbers on a 
sheet of paper. These groupings were later used to calculate 
an H statistic (Attneave, 1959; Scott, 1962) for each 
participant, which in turn was used as an index of RRSC.
During the same session, participants completed the 34- 
item version of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982; see Appendix B), which includes the subscale 
measuring cognitive complexity first identified by Tanaka et 
al. (1988). Participants also completed the Attributional
Complexity Scale (Fletcher et al., 1986; see Appendix C), 
which was ambiguously called the "Person Perception 
Questionnaire." Reliability estimates were computed for the 
current sample and were similar to those reported by other 
researchers (NCS: a=.84; ACS: a=.89; CC: a=.58).
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In addition, participants completed a questionnaire 
designed to assess the extremity of affective response to 
two positive and two negative relationship scenarios (see 
Appendix D ) . These scenarios were constructed to describe 
mildly positive and negative relationship events. 
Participants were asked to imagine themselves taking part in 
each scenario. For example, one scenario asks participants 
to imagine that their romantic partners have prepared a 
special meal for them. Another scenario invites participants 
to imagine that their partners have backed out of dinner 
plans in order to study. After reading each relationship 
scenario, participants rated the extent to which they would 
feel five positive and four negative emotions using a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). The card- 
sorting task and administration of the questionnaire set 
were counterbalanced to prevent order effects.
Questionnaires were not counterbalanced within a 
questionnaire set.
Micro Experimental Laboratory (MEL; Schneider, 1988), a 
programming language intended to aid in the creation of 
computerized psychological and behavioral measures, was used 
to create a program to assess variability and extremity in 
relationship-oriented evaluations over time. Before 
participants left the experimental session, they were each 
given a diskette to take home. Participants were instructed 
to find a computer at approximately the same time every day
20
for 14 consecutive days and to answer questions posed to 
them by a MEL program provided on the diskette (see Appendix 
E for a list of the questions). The program collected daily 
measures of satisfaction, degree of love and commitment, 
trust, jealousy, anger, etc. for up to 14 consecutive days. 
The majority of the questions assessed how the participants 
felt at that moment on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 9 (very much). Example questions are "How angry do you 
feel with your partner right now?" and "How worried are you 
right now about your relationship breaking up?" Responses to 
these questions were used to compute a variability score for 
each participant. In addition, 14 questions were included to 
assess the extremity of relationship-oriented evaluations 
over time (see Appendix E). A MEL program was felt to be not 
only appropriate, but necessary, for two reasons. First, it 
allowed an opportunity to ascertain that participants did, 
in fact, complete their evaluations on a daily basis rather 
than complete multiple evaluations on a single day. Second, 
it prevented participants from either reviewing or changing 
their own responses from previous days.
Upon leaving, participants signed up to attend one of 
several debriefing sessions to be held after the disks were 
returned at the end of the designated two-week period.
RESULTS 
Measuring Schema Complexity
Many tests have been designed to measure cognitive or
21
schema complexity. Scott, Osgood, and Peterson (1979) 
describe a number of statistics which could be used as 
measures of cognitive dimensionality, among them Attneave's 
H (first described in Attneave, 1959) . Likewise, Linville 
(1985) and Scott (1962) use Attneave's H as measures of 
cognitive dimensionality.
Attneave's H (also known as Scott's H) has become one 
of the most popular measures of schema complexity in current 
literature. Thus, Attneave's H was used in the present
study. To calculate H, participants are asked to sort 
instances of a particular domain (e.g., attributes of a 
person, adjectives relating to the self, etc.) into 
meaningful categories. The categories may overlap to any 
extent, and there can be as few or as many categories as 
desired. The H statistic is designed to combine the number 
of categories with the degree to which the categories 
overlap. A larger H indicates a higher degree of complexity 
in the domain under investigation.
H is derived from the following equation:
H = Spilog2 (1/pi) = log2n - (1/n) T>n i l o g 2n i 
where n is the total number of attributes or traits used, nt 
is the number of these traits that are used in a particular 
grouping, and Pi = (ni/n). Scott (1962) warns that H may 
only represent a sort of lower bound for cognitive 
complexity, as it is unlikely that such a measure will 
entirely exhaust a participant's category system. He also
22
warns that H can only be Interpreted as a structural 
property of a cognitive domain, that it is separate from 
content. Thus, a schema may be complex, yet entirely 
erroneous.
Millar and Tesser (1986) successfully used Atteave's H 
statistic, as well as a simple count of card piles formed by 
each participant, to assess schema complexity. Although a 
simple pile count is admittedly less suited to the purpose 
than Attneave's H, the fact that participants showed that 
they had more complex schemas about individuals than about 
groups was reflected by both the number of piles formed by 
subjects and Attneave's H statistic. This "simple count" 
method was also used by Linville (1987) as an additional 
measure of self-complexity. In the present study, A simple 
pile count, in addition to Attneave's H, was used to measure 
RRSC, whereas "cognitive complexity" was assessed using the 
NCS subscale described by Tanaka et al. (1988).
A measure of evaluative variability was obtained by 
reverse scoring negative variability items, collapsing all 
15 responses for a particular day, and then computing the 
standard deviation of the resulting means to arrive at a 
single measure of variability for each participant. These 
scores were intended to reflect the variability of each 
participant's responses over a two-week period. Variability 
scores ranged from .03 to .87 (M=.35, SD=.20), with higher 
scores indicating greater affective variability.
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Of the original 49 participants, 42 (27 men and 15 
women) contributed to the analyses involving affective 
variability. One participant failed to turn in his MEL disk. 
Another participant's MEL disk malfunctioned. Five 
additional participants answered questions on fewer than six 
of the 14 days of data collection. Their data were discarded 
as unreliable. Very few participants contributed data for 
the full 14 days (M=ll days, Mode=12 days), but one 
participant provided data from 15 days. Many participants 
attempted to cheat the system by answering several days' 
question sets in one sitting. Careful comparison of the 
dates entered by participants and those recorded by the MEL 
program made apparent the days for which data were 
fabricated. In such cases only the first answer set provided 
on a given day was considered valid.
Four scores of affective extremity were measured by 
averaging each participant's score on the five positive 
emotion questions within the two positive scenarios (M=6.02, 
SD=.98), the five positive questions within the two negative 
scenarios (M=5.98, SD=1.1), the four negative questions 
within the two positive scenarios (M=3.68, SD=1.02), and the 
four negative questions within the two negative scenarios 
(M=2.81, SD=.98). Two additional affective extremity scores 
were obtained by averaging participants' responses to a 
positive question (M=7.23, SD=.92) and a negative question 
(M=3.3, SD=1.07) about their partners which were included in
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the MEL program (See Appendix E). Relationship length, 
measured in weeks at the time of arrival at the lab, ranged 
from 7 weeks to 4.17 years (M=60.02 weeks, SD=53.4 weeks).
H was calculated for each participant using Linville's 
H program (P. W. Linville, personal communication, 1997). H 
ranged from 1.703 to 4.889 (M=3.208, SD=.83). H and the 
simple pile count were independently correlated with 
affective extremity (all six measures), affective 
variability, and participants' scores on the ACS, the NCS, 
the cognitive complexity subscale of the NCS, gender, and 
relationship length. See Table 1 for a summary of the. 
overall findings and Tables 2 and 3 for findings subdivided 
by participant gender.
Out of the entire battery, very few of the findings 
were statistically significant. The simple pile count as a 
measure of RRSC was, contrary to predictions, positively 
related to affective variability (r=.38, p<.014), 
particularly for women (r=.57, p<.002). A Fisher's r to z 
transformation showed that the male and female correlation 
coefficients, -.30 and .57 respectively, were different 
(Z=2.71). In addition, regression analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between sex and variability in their 
ability to predict RRSC as measured by the number of card 
piles (R2 change=.27, p<.01).
DISCUSSION
The positive correlation between the number of card
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piles and variability was unexpected, but not inexplicable. 
Stein (1994) found that individuals with low self-schema 
complexity reacted less strongly to negative feedback than 
did those with high self-schema complexity. Stein suggests 
that in low complexity individuals, a defensive reaction 
causes the individual to discount negative feedback, 
reaffirming a strongly positive view of the self. This 
finding contradicts Linville's buffering hypothesis and 
offers a possible explanation for the positive correlation. 
That is, Stein (1994) would argue that a simple romantic 
relationship schema, not a complex one, should act as a 
buffer against negative relationship events by causing an 
individual to discount them, reaffirming a positive view of 
the relationship.
The finding that the number of piles predicts affective 
variability for women but not for men is illuminating. 
Reasons why the effect was not found for men could include 
the small sample size (n=15). Future research could address 
the question of why low RRSC acts as a buffer against 
negative reactions to relationship-related events for women 
but not for men.
The relationship scenario questions were always 
presented immediately after the NCS and ACS. The lack of a 
relationship between H and affective extremity might be due 
in part to a failure to counterbalance the order of 
questionnaires within a questionnaire set, though it is not
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entirely clear how or why this would occur. Approximately 
half of the participants completed the questionnaires after 
the card-sorting task. It is theoretically possible that 
fatigue from filling out other questionnaires and sorting 
cards led participants to devote less than optimal attention 
to the task at hand.
The lack of a correlation between relationship length 
and RRSC can be explained by restriction of range. Because 
the sample consisted entirely of college students, 
relationship lengths tended to be short. It is possible 
that, had the sample consisted of older married or dating 
couples, an effect for relationship length would have 
emerged. Also, because relationships were relatively short 
in duration, it is possible that variability in relationship 
length was restricted. If there was a restriction of range 
problem, future research should include relationships 
varying widely in length. In addition, it is possible that 
the relationships studied were too long to gain a proper 
understanding of the relationship between schema complexity 
and relationship length. In other words, perhaps RRSC 
reaches a maximum level relatively early in a relationship. 
If that is the case, then future research should examine 
relationships in relatively early stages of development.
The lack of a relationship between Attributional 
Complexity and the number of card piles is disappointing, 
but not perplexing. If the ACS had been modified to refer
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specifically to one's romantic relationship partner instead 
of to people in general, perhaps an effect would have 
emerged. The ACS assesses the complexity of a higher-order, 
broadly applicable level of information processing, whereas 
the focus of the present study is on processing relevant to 
a specific other. Thus, attributional complexity and RRSC 
(as measured by the number of card piles) represent 
different levels of schema specificity and should not be 
expected to bear a strong relationship.
Similarly, the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982), Cognitive Complexity subscale (Tanaka et al., 
1988), and Attributional Complexity Scale (Fletcher et al., 
1986) were uncorrelated with RRSC as measured by Attneave's 
H statistic. It is not clear why no relationship is evident. 
However, the fact that the NCS and ACS were positively 
correlated (r=.53, pc.Ol) confirms the findings of Fletcher 
et al. (1986), and suggests that these two scales operated
in a similar way for current participants as they did for 
those in Fletcher et al.1s (1986) original study. The fact 
that the ACS and NCS "behave" correctly indicates that 
something was wrong with the method of assessing RRSC using 
Attneave's H.
It must be concluded that there is not much support for 
the method of assessing relationship schema complexity 
presented in this study. There is little question that 
people have schemas unique to each romantic relationship
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(how else could a person navigate the intricacies of 
relationships with unique individuals?), and that complexity 
must be an individual difference associated with them. The 
problem must lie in the’assessment of that complexity. While 
the card sorting task (Linville, 1985) remains an excellent 
method of assessing self-schema complexity, the method may 
not be transferable to romantic relationship schemas.
Because the 34 relationship descriptors could be taken to 
describe one's partner, it is possible that participants 
envisioned their romantic partners rather than their 
relationships with those partners. A representation of one's 
romantic partner is probably more easily accessible than an 
abstract concept like a relationship.
The fact that the number of card piles was related to 
affective variability whereas H was not suggests that a 
measure of differential complexity might be a better 
assessor of RRSC than a measure which combines differential 
and integrative complexity. It is not clear why such 
measures should provide a better assessment of complexity, 
considering that they, by definition, rely on less 
information, but Martin (1991) was able to demonstrate the 
test-retest reliability of the RCCI, as well as discriminant 
validity relative to measures of verbal intelligence and 
cognitive complexity. In addition, Millar and Tesser (19 86) 
showed that a simple count of card piles agreed roughly with 
an estimate of complexity obtained by calculating Attneave's
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H statistic.
It could be argued that the present study contains 
certain methodological flaws which rendered the detection of 
significant relationships between variables unlikely. For 
example, due to the scarcity of undergraduates meeting the 
criteria for participation, the sample size was quite small. 
However, the small effect sizes tend to argue against the 
usefulness of including more participants in the design. In 
addition, inadequate measures of affective variability were 
obtained from the participants using the take-home MEL 
program. Because of attrition, inattentiveness to the data 
collection regimen, and outright data fabrication, only 
about 70% of the potential data were collected. Furthermore, 
because participants could not be trusted to deliver the 
appropriate number of daily reports, it is highly likely 
that the data that were delivered -are flawed in other 
respects. For example, it is quite likely that participants 
gave only cursory attention to the questions being asked or 
entered random answers "just to get it over with." Future 
studies may benefit from varying the order of question 
presentation or including lie scales in order to detect 
fraudulent responses. Another reasonable line of argument is 
that the card sorting task is a good method of assessing 
RRSC, but that something was wrong with the other measures 
of individual differences. For example, threats to the 
validity and reliability of the variability and extremity
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measures have already been discussed.
This line of research should not be abandoned. Future 
studies should seek to establish the validity of the card- 
sorting method of assessing RRSC by measuring the 
relationship between it and Martin's RCCI (1991). Since 
romantic relationship schemas are expected to change over 
time, test-retest reliability may be difficult to establish 
unless a short inter-test interval is used.
In addition, it should be made more explicit to 
participants that they are to envision the relationship, not 
the partner, when sorting relationship descriptors into 
meaningful groups. It could be that the romantic 
relationship is inseparable from the romantic partner. In 
other words, the romantic relationship schema may be merely 
one part of a more complex and extensive "romantic partner 
schema." If this is the case, perhaps the schema of interest 
is not the relationship at all, but the specific partner 
schema. If such schemas exist (and they surely do), 
complexity is certainly an attribute worthy of investigation 
because it can lead to very interesting predictions. For 
example, perhaps those with relatively simple partner 
schemas are more extreme in their evaluations of the 
partner, or on the impact of the partner's behavior on the 
relationship.
Even though romantic relationship schema complexity was 
not found to be strongly related to the extremity or
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variability of affective responses to relationship events, 
it may be related to other measures of relationship-related 
individual differences. For example, RRSC could be related 
to the willingness to continue to invest in the 
relationship. In addition, RRSC could be a factor in 
predicting whether a romantic partner is likely to respond 
in an extreme manner to relationship dissatisfaction (see 
Rusbult, Zembrodt, & Gunn, 1982). Overall, there is still 
much territory to cover in close relationships research, and 
schema complexity should not be ignored as a potential 
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[Items found to load onto the cognitive complexity factor by 
Tanaka et al. (1988) are indicated by asterisks. Reverse-
scored items are indicated by a t]
Last 4 digits of SS#: ___________________
There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested 
in your own perceptions. Please answer each question as 
honestly and accurately as you can, but don't spend too much 
time thinking about each answer. Please rate the following 
questions on the scale below each question, where 1 equals 
"disagree completely" and 9 equals "agree completely":
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
disagree neither agree agree
completely nor disagree completely
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up 
with new solutions to problems.
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, 
difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought.
* I tend to set goals that can be accomplished 
only by expending considerable mental effort.
I am usually tempted to put more thought into a 
task than the job minimally requires.
t Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me 
very much.
t I am hesitant about making important decisions 
after thinking about them.
I usually end up deliberating about issues even 
when they do not affect me personally.
t I prefer just to let things happen rather than 
try to understand why they turned out that way.
t I have difficulty thinking in new and unfamiliar 
situations.
t The idea of relying on thought to make my way to 
the top does not appeal to me.
*t The notion of thinking abstractly is not 
appealing to me.
I am an intellectual.
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t I only think as hard as I have to.
t I don't reason well under pressure.
t I like tasks that require little thought once 
I 've learned them.
t I prefer to think about small, daily projects to 
long-term ones.
t I would rather do something that requires little 
thought than something that is sure to challenge 
my thinking abilities.
t I find little satisfaction in deliberating hard 
and for long hours.
* I more often talk with other people about the 
reasons for and possible solutions to 
international problems than about gossip or 
tidbits of what famous people are doing.
t These days, I see little chance for performing 
well, even in "intellectual" jobs, unless one 
knows the right people.
t More often than not, more thinking just leads to 
more errors.
t I don't like to have the responsibility of 
handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking.
I appreciate opportunities to discover the 
strengths and weaknesses of my own reasoning.
t I feel relief rather than satisfaction after 
completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort.
*+ Thinking is not my idea of fun.
t I try to anticipate and avoid situations where 
there is a likely chance I will have to think in 
depth about something.
* I prefer watching educational to entertainment 
programs.
* I think best when those around me are very 
intelligent.
* I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that 
I must solve.
* I would prefer complex to simple problems.
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t Simply knowing the answer rather than
understanding the reasons for the answer to a 
problem is fine with me.
t It's enough for me that something gets the job 
done, I don't care how or why it works.
t Ignorance is bliss.
I enjoy thinking about an issue even when the 
results of my thought will have no effect on the 





L a s t  4 d i g i t s  o f  SS#: ________________________
Person Perception Questionnaire
This questionnaire has been designed to investigate the 
different ways that people think about themselves and other 
people. There are no right or wrong answers. We are 
interested in your own perceptions. Please answer each 
question as honestly and accurately as you can, but don't 
spend too much time thinking about each answer. Please rate 
the following questions on the scale below each question, 
where 1 equals "strongly disagree" and 9 equals "strongly 
agree":
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
disagree neither agree agree
completely nor disagree completely
I don't usually bother to analyze and explain 
people's behavior.
Once I have figured out a single cause for a 
person's behavior I don't usually go any 
further.
I believe it is important to analyze and 
understand our own thinking processes.
I think a lot about the influence that I have on 
other people's behavior.
I have found that the relationships between a 
person's attitudes, beliefs, and character 
traits are usually simple and straightforward.
If I see people behaving in a really strange or 
unusual manner I usually put it down to the fact 
that they are strange or unusual people and 
don't bother to explain it any further.
I have thought a lot about the family background 
and personal history of people who are close to 
me, in order to understand why they are the sort 
of people they are.
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I don't enjoy getting into discussions where the 
causes for people's behavior are being talked 
over.
I have found that the causes for people's 
behavior are usually complex rather than simple.
I am very interested in understanding how my own 
thinking works when I make judgments about 
people or attach causes to their behavior.
I think very little about the different ways 
that people influence each other.
To understand a person's personality/behavior I 
have found it is important to know how that 
person's attitudes, beliefs, and character 
traits fit together.
When I try to explain other people's behavior I 
concentrate on the person and don't worry too 
much about all the existing external factors 
that might be affecting them.
I have often found that the basic cause for a 
person's behavior is located far back in time.
I really enjoy analyzing the reasons or causes 
for people's behavior.
I usually find that complicated explanations for 
people's behavior are confusing rather than 
helpful.
I give little thought to how my thinking works 
in the process of understanding or explaining 
people's behavior.
I think very little about the influence that 
other people have on my behavior.
I have thought a lot about the way that 
different parts of my personality influence 
other parts (e.g., beliefs affecting attitudes 
or attitudes affecting character traits).
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I think a lot about the influence that society 
has on other people.
When I analyze a person's behavior I often find 
the causes form a chain that goes back in time, 
sometimes for years.
I am not really curious about human behavior.
I prefer simple rather than complex explanations 
for people's behavior.
When the reasons I give for my own behavior are 
different from someone else's, this often makes 
me think about the thinking processes that lead 
to my explanations.
I believe that to understand a person you need 
to understand the people who that person has 
close contact with.
I tend to take people's behavior at face value 
and not worry about the inner causes for their 
behavior (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, etc).
I think a lot about the influence that society 
has on my behavior and personality.
I have thought very little about my own family 
background and personal history in order to 
understand why I am the sort of person I am.
How long have you been involved in your current romantic 
relationship?





L a s t  4 d i g i t s  o f  SS#:
Relationship Evaluation Extremity Measure
Read the following scenarios that could occur in 
romantic relationships. Think about these scenarios as if 
they happened in your present relationship. Really try to 
put yourself in the situation. What types of emotions would 
you feel in these situations? After reading each scenario 
and thinking about how the situation would make you feel, 
answer the questions following each paragraph using this 
scale:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at very much
all
You come home from a hard day of classes to find your 
significant other making a special meal for you. He/she has 
also bought you something that you have been wanting for a 
long time. It is not your birthday or anniversary.
Using the scale printed above, to what extent would you feel 
each of the following?
  happy   in love with your partner
worried excited
upset   loved by your partner
jealous   angry
secure
You have been noticing that your significant other is not 
paying as much attention as usual to your relationship. A 
friend of yours tells you that he/she has seen your 
significant other at a party the night before with another 
guy/girl. Your significant other told you that he/she was at 
a party with his/her friends.
Using the scale printed above, to what extent would you feel 
each of the following?
  happy ___ in love with your partner
worried excited
upset   loved by your partner
jealous   angry
secure
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at very much
all
You have been upset about several things lately. Your 
problems have nothing to do with your relationship, but you 
have told your significant other about them. You come home 
from classes and the first thing your significant other asks 
you about is if you have worked out some of the problems. 
He/she listens attentively and offers several good 
suggestions.
Using the scale printed above, to what extent would you feel 
each of the following?
  happy   in love with your partner
worried excited
upset   loved by your partner
jealous   angry
secure
You and your significant other have had dinner plans for a 
week now. The day of the dinner, your significant other 
backs out of the plans saying he/she has too much studying 
to do to take time out to go to dinner.
Using the scale printed above, to what extent would you feel 
each of the following?
happy ___ in love with your partner
worried ___ excited





Affective Variability and Extremity Scalp
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[*Items used to calculate affective extremity]
Remember, we are interested in how you feel right now.
How satisfied are you with your relationship right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very much
How much do you love your partner right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very much
How committed do you feel to your relationship right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very much
How loved by your partner do you feel right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very much
How much do you trust your partner right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very much
How secure do you feel about your relationship right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not at all very much
How jealous do you feel right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very much
How worried are you right now about your relationship
breaking up?
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9
not at all very much
How angry do you feel with your partner right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very much
How excited are you to see your partner again?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very much
How much change would you like to see in your partner's
behavior?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
none at all very much
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How glad are you to be in this relationship right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very glad
How much do you like your partner right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all very much
How rewarding is your relationship to you right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not at all very rewarding
How irritating is your partner to you right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not at all very irritating
*Think about the most positive thing that your partner did
today. How positive was that?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not at all very positive
*Think about the most negative thing that your partner did
today. How negative was that?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
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